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Abstract: The formal financial institutions in India have ventured into
microfinance in a massive way by adopting the SHG-Bank Linkage Program
model. The present paper makes an attempt to review the performance of
the program in different states of India and across three major institutions—commercial banks, cooperatives, and the regional rural banks. The study
also presents vital information about the leading NGOs with major credit
linkages in Indian states.

T

his study attempts to review the spread of credit linkages between self-help groups (SHGs) and banks across
credit delivery models adapted by the Reserve Bank of
India (RBI) and the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural
Development (NABARD). It further examines the spread of
credit linkages across different regions and states of India. It
also reviews the participation of commercial banks, regional
rural banks, and cooperatives in the SHG-Bank Linkage
Program across different states in India.
The analytical section of the paper is divided in five parts.
The first section reviews the spread of self-help group linkages
to banks across three different models that have been adopted
by the National Bank to route credit to SHGs. The second
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section assesses the coverage of SHG linkages for three years
from 1997–98 to 1999–2000 and reviews their spread across
regions. The third section studies the distribution of SHGs
across states and union territories of India. It also uses correlations to understand the relationship between poverty, human
development, and the spread of NGOs in Indian states. The
fourth section studies the state-by-state participation of commercial banks, regional rural banks, and cooperatives and provides a brief backdrop of these institutions. The fifth section
identifies the non-government organizations/self-help promoting institutions with maximum SHG credit linkages and presents some preliminary information about these organizations.
The study is based on secondary data published by the
NABARD in India. Out of the 114,775 SHGs credit linked to
banks, 94,645 were refinanced by NABARD and accounted for
83% of the total SHGs linked from the inception of the program until March 2000. As the data for all the SHGs credit
linked to banks was not available, we have based our study on
SHGs refinanced by NABARD. Considering that they formed
83% of the total SHGs credit linked, it is assumed that results
derived from the analysis are likely to hold true for all SHGs.
By 2000, the SHG-bank linkage program had established linkages in the states of Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, Haryana,
Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura,
Sikkim, Manipur, Orissa, Bihar, West Bengal, Madhya
Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Goa, Andhra
Pradesh Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu, the Union
Territory of Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and the Union
Territory of Pondichery; hence the analysis is limited to these
areas.
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The Background
Out of around one billion people in India, 26% are poor
(National Statistical Sample Organization, 2000). At the bottom the poor need credit for small productive assets, working
capital, housing, illness, and emergencies. The demand for
credit here is not only large but heterogeneous as well. Till the
1990s the rural financial system in India was predominantly
supply driven with the state playing a major role in improving
the access to financial services by the poor. While state intervention considerably improved the outreach of the banking
system and expanded rural credit, it also allowed rent seeking
tendencies and credit indiscipline to grow (Nanda, 2000). By
the late 1980s, the rural financial system had virtually collapsed amid heavy regulations, distraught market conditions,
dual lines of control, and mounting arrears. The beginning of
1990 saw India face one of its worst balance of payment crises.
In 1991, under the initiative of the International Monetary
Fund, India undertook a liberalization of its economy.
Liberalization had an important bearing on the financial sector; banks, which had turned weak, were confronted with the
challenge of making themselves profitable while maintaining
their prudential requirements and competing with private and
foreign banks in a new liberalized milieu.
At this time, the rural credit system needed a fresh
approach that could induce rationalization of the processes,
policy, and regulations and consequently increase returns.
Around this time, Asian countries like Bangladesh, Indonesia,
Sri Lanka, and Thailand and Latin American countries like
Bolivia, Cambodia, and Chile were effectively adopting the
new microfinance approach. One of the reasons for the universal popularity of the approach was the extraordinary repayment rate of 95% and more. The extraordinary repayment
rates of the microfinance institutions (MFIs) provided the
required “leverage” for transforming poverty alleviation exercises into business opportunities.
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In India, the adaptation of the new microfinance approach
by rural financial institutions assumed the form of the “SelfHelp Group–Bank Linkage Program.” After an initial pilot
study the RBI set up a working group on non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and SHGs. The working group made
recommendations for internalization of the SHG concept as a
potential intervention tool in the area of banking with the
poor. The RBI was quick to accept the recommendations and
advised the banks to consider mainstreaming lending to SHGs
as part of their rural credit operations.
The SHG-bank linkage program is gaining increasing
acceptance amongst NGO community and bankers. The
NABARD envisions covering one third of the rural population
in India by establishing one million SHGs. The government of
India has already made announcements for linking 200,000
SHGs by year 2002–03. The task force on microfinance sees the
SHG-bank linkage program emerging as a major way of banking with the poor in coming years. It is estimated that at least
25,000 bank branches, 4000 NGOs, and 2000 federations of
SHGs involving 0.10 million personnel of these institutions
will be involved in scaling up microfinance to this magnitude.
Under the SHG-bank linkage program, NGOs and banks
interact with the poor, especially women, to form small
homogenous groups. These small groups are encouraged to
meet frequently and collect small thrift amounts from their
members and are taught simple accounting methods to enable
them to maintain their accounts. Although individually these
poor could never have enough savings to open a bank account,
the pooled savings enable them to open a formal bank account
in the name of the group. This is the first step in establishing
links with the formal banking system. Groups then, meet often
and use the pooled thrift to impart small loans to members for
meeting their small emergent needs. This saves them from usurious debt traps and thus begins their empowerment through
group dynamics, decision-making, and funds management.
Gradually the pooled thrift grows and soon they are ready to
24
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receive external funds in multiples of their group savings.
Bank loans enable the group members to undertake incomegenerating activities.
There are several advantages of the group lending setup.
For one, rather than a bank, borrowers themselves undertake
the task of credit evaluation; this creates a peer screening effect
and reduces the transaction costs as community members have
much better information than banks (Andersen and Nina,
1998). Two, there is the peer monitoring effect that induces
group members to use their loans in productive ways; Stiglitz
(1990), Varain (1990), and Banerjee and Newman (1994) have
developed models that illustrate the working of the peer monitoring effect. Three, the desire to preserve valuable social ties
induces borrowers to spend extra effort if necessary to secure
timely payments. Social ties are valuable because they allow
members to borrow in the future and provide business connections. Moreover, a very important feature of group lending is
the collateral effect. Bank’s losses incurred due to unsuccessful
projects are generally reduced as successful entrepreneurs
within each group cover part of their losses (Andersen and
Nina, 1998).
Through the SHG-bank linkage program the RBI and
NABARD have tried to promote relationship banking, i.e.,
improving the existing relationship between the poor and
bankers with the social intermediation of NGOs. The Indian
model is predominantly a “Linkage Model,” which draws upon
the strengths of various partners: NGOs, who are best in mobilizing the poor and building their capacities, and bankers,
whose financial strength is financing. As compared to other
countries where parallel model of lending to the poor is predominant, the Indian linkage model tries to use the existing
formal financial network to increase the outreach to the poor,
while ensuring the necessary flexibility of operations for both
bankers and the poor. Various credit delivery innovations such
as Grameen Bank Replications, NGO networking, credit
unions, and SHG federations have been encouraged by
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NABARD for increasing the outreach. It has also instituted a
Micro Credit Innovations Department for planning, propagating, and facilitating the microfinance movement.
Given the network of institutional structures supporting
the microfinance movement, the SHG-bank linkage program
has been increasing its outreach substantially. Together the
commercial banks, cooperatives, and regional rural banks had
succeeded in linking 114,775 SHGs by March 2000. With an
average size of 20 members per group, the program had
reached over 2.2 million households. A large majority (85%)
of the SHGs linked to banks were essentially women’s groups.
The new microfinance approach has benefited women largely
and has emerged prominently as a women’s program in rural
India.

Review of SHG-Bank Linkage Program in India
Review of Models
In India, three types of SHG models have emerged:
1. Bank-SHG-Members: The bank itself acts as a self-help
group promoting institution (SHPI).
2. Bank-Facilitating Agency-SHG-Members: Facilitating
agencies like NGOs, government agencies, or other
community-based organizations form groups.
3. Bank-NGO-MFI-SHG-Members: NGOs act both as facilitators and microfinance intermediaries. First they promote
groups, nurture them, and train them, and then they
approach banks for bulk loans for lending to the SHGs.
Table 1. Models of SHG Linkages
SHGs
Model

Number
of linkages

1
2
3

13561
65636
15448

26

Bank Loans

Percentage
Amount
Percentage
of total (Rs in millions) of total
14
70
16

339.79
1339.95
250.10

18
69
13
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The second model, where SHGs were formed and nurtured
by the NGOs, was more popular among the bankers. Banks
opened saving accounts and then provided credit directly to
the SHGs, while NGOs acted as facilitators. This approach has
been widely accepted by the practitioners partly because of the
large scale participation of state government through development agencies like the District Rural Development Agency
(DRDA), District Women Development Agency (DWDA), and
some of the centrally sponsored social sector missions, and also
because of special initiatives of NABARD.
Sixteen percent of the SHGs were credit linked under the
third model where NGOs acted as facilitators as well as microfinance intermediaries. Under this model, NGOs formed SHG
federations and then facilitated them to assume the role of
MFIs. This model is expected to gain wider recognition with
smaller banks venturing into large scale financing of SHGs.
Under the first model SHG linkages were facilitated through
NABARD’s policy of converting regional rural banks (RRBs)
into self-help promoting institutions (SHPIs).

Review by Region (1997–98 to 1999–00)
The SHG-bank linkage program has been operating in India
since 1992–93 but has gained momentum only since 1997–98.
Figure 1. SHG Linkages by Region (1997–98 to 1999–00)
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Out of the total SHGs credit linked by banks up to March,
2000, 90% were linked only during last three years. The SHG
linkage program seems to have picked up since the Global
Microcredit Summit held in Washington D.C. in 1997.
Right from the inception, the program has been a major
success in South India. Its share in the SHG coverage had risen
from 60% to 68% from 1997–98 to 1999–00. The number of
SHGs credit linked in the central region had increased due to a
sharp rise in credit linkages in Uttar Pradesh. In the eastern
and the western regions, the number of SHG links had
increased, but these regions’ share of the total linkages had
decreased. In the north and the northeastern regions, the linkage program had not gained much acceptability.

Table 2. Distribution of SHG Credit Links by State
Population Population below
SHG
States
distribution
poverty line
linkages
Andhra Pradesh
Uttar Pradesh
Tamil Nadu
Karnataka
Kerala
Maharashta
Orissa
West Bengal
Gujarat
Madhya Pradesh
Rajasthan
Bihar
Rest of
States/UT

7.90
16.4
6.60
5.30
3.40
9.30
3.74
8.04
4.88
7.80
5.19
10.20

15.77
31.15
21.12
20.04
12.72
25.02
42.50
27.02
14.07
37.43
15.28
42.60

42.26
11.29
12.10
9.24
4.84
4.32
3.54
2.96
2.62
2.01
1.69
1.66

9.58

17.39

1.47

Notes: The figures are in percentiles. The rest of the states and union territories (UT) include Hamachal Pradesh, Haryana, Punjab, Jammu & Kashmir,
Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, Sikkim, Manipur, UT of Andaman and Nicobar
Islands, Goa, and UT of Pondichery.
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Analysis by State
During the past few years, India has tried several credit models
to alleviate poverty, some of which were formulated without
considering spatial dimensions. Land is a factor that is far more
complex with its sociocultural factors and typology that creates imbalances in the market and the socioeconomic growth
of the people. Of the aspects that affect the success of the program, very important are its suitability and adaptability among
practitioners as well as the poor living in that region.
The program since its initiation has shown severe spatial
preferences. It has been predominant in certain states, namely,
Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Karnataka.
These four states accounted for two-thirds of the SHG credit
linkages, with Andhra Pradesh alone accounting for 40%. Of
these four states, only Uttar Pradesh had a higher poverty ratio
(31.15%) than the national average of 26.1%. Some of the factors identified for the outstanding performance of Andhra
Pradesh in the SHG-bank linkage program were the following:
(a) Forty percent of the SHGs that were credit linked under
Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas
(DWCRA) were concentrated in Andhra Pradesh alone. (b)
2700 groups were promoted in that state under a special project
sponsored by United Nations Development Program called
South Asia Poverty Alleviation Program. (c) The credit movement in the south led to the evolution of community based
development finance institutions, which were composed of
SHGs promoted by NGOs or by district rural development
agencies. (d) District collectors, NABARD district development managers, and lead bank managers profoundly supported
the SHG-bank linkage program in the state. (e) Leading NGOs
in the microfinance sector in India, like Mysore Resettlement
and Development Agency (MYRADA), Society for Helping
Awaking Rural Poor through Education (SHARE) and
Bharatiya Samruddhi Investments Consulting Services Ltd.
(BASIX), were also working in Andhra Pradesh.
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Uttar Pradesh is one of the densely populated states with a
high incidence of poverty. Among all the states of India, the
Human Development Index is lowest in Uttar Pradesh. Credit
links here were facilitated by Uttar Pradesh Land Development
Corporation, which is implementing a World Bank–aided Land
Development Program with the component of organizing the
rural poor as SHGs. CASPOR Ltd. and the Grameen Project of
Oriental Bank of Commerce have also supported a number of
SHG credit links in Uttar Pradesh. The other two states,
Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, in south India were supported by
large sized NGOs like MYRADA and SHARE. As these
NGOs had greater creditability it enabled them to leverage
bank finance easily. Moreover, as the microfinance movement
had “originated” in South India, the awareness and acceptability of the program was relatively higher. Kerala, Maharashtra,
Orissa, West Bengal, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and
Bihar together had 23.6% of SHG linkages while the remaining
states and union territories had only 1.47%.
Rajasthan, Meghalaya, Orissa, Bihar, West Bengal, Madhya
Pradesh, and Gujarat have been identified by NABARD for
having higher potential of increasing SHG outreach. In general
the lower credit linkages in some of these states can be
explained by a lack of concentrated efforts by banks; the
inability of banks to identify NGOs with savings and credit
groups; a lack of motivation among bankers; a lack of large
sized NGOs with previous background working with SHGs;
and the unsuitability of the approach to the region.
One of the questions that arose after reviewing the spread
of SHGs in different states was, did the spread of SHG credit
linkages across India have a systematic approach? To investigate this, we have calculated the coefficient of correlation of
the number of SHGs credit linked with the population,
Human Development Index (HDI), incidence of poverty, and
spread of NGOs across Indian states. As the HDI was not available for the union territories of Andaman and Nicobar Islands
and Pondichery, they have not been included in correlations.
30
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Table 3. Correlation Results
Correlation
State Population
Incidence of poverty of
All states
States with poverty
below national average
States with poverty
above national average
Number of NGOs in the State*
State HDI**

Coefficient of Correlation
0.46
-0.01167
-0.505
-0.089
0.39
-0.06478

Notes: Poverty results exclude Andhra Pradesh because it was identified as
outlier.
* Number of NGOs involved in establishing SH linkages during 1999–2000.
** Source for HDI figures NCAER (1994).

The results indicated that at macro level, there seemed to be no
correlation between the spread of SHGs and the poverty and
HDI of Indian states. However, further analysis suggests that
states that were better off (had a lower incidence of poverty
than the national average of 26.1%) had a better spread of
SHGs. Besides one of the significant finding was that the SHGbank linkage program seems to be following the presence of
NGOs in various states rather than deprivation and poverty.

Analysis of Banks
The NABARD, Small Industrial Development Bank of India,
Housing Urban Development Corporation, and Rastriya
Mahila Kosh are some of the institutions that operate as the
wholesale financers of microfinance. As “bulk financiers,”
they leverage funds from the government, market, donors, and
lenders for lending to its partners and NGOs.
Reserve Bank of India and the government lend support to
the SHG-bank linkage program through policy formulation
and regulation while the NABARD acts as a facilitator and a
refinancing agency. The program at the grass root level is
Volume 5 Number 1
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Table 4. Cumulative Distribution to SHGs by Type of
Bank
SHG-Bank linkages

Banks
Commercial
Banks
RRBs
Cooperative
Banks
Total

Percentage
Number
of total

Total loan
(Rs in
millions)

Average
loan per group
(Rs in millions)

51,619
38,998

55
41

1278.33
574.59

24,765
14,736

4,028
94,645

4
100

76.90
1929.82

19,091
20,390

Data as of 31 March 2000.

executed through a network of commercial banks, regional
rural bank (RRBs), district central cooperative banks (DCCBs),
and primary agricultural credit societies (PACS). The program
has been gradually gathering momentum. A review of the SHG
credit linkages by these institutions indicated that commercial
banks had established the maximum linkages. The RRBs had a
sizable coverage but the performance of cooperatives in the
program was minimal. The average loan per SHG also followed a similar pattern.
Commercial Banks: From the 1950s through 1970s,
the financial system in many developing countries was predominantly composed of state-owned banks and branches of
foreign owned commercial banks that provided short term
commercial and trade credit. The state-owned banks also promoted economic development priorities through a network of
financial institutions such as agricultural, development, and
export banks (World Bank, 1989; Gonzalez-Vega & Graham,
1995). The Indian banking system was also organized on a similar basis. The process of institutionalizing rural credit
by commercial banks 1 began with the nationalization of 14 private banks in 1969. Nationalization of banks led to “socialization” of Indian banks with interest rate regulations, branch
32
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expansion, and supply-driven, target-oriented programs under
priority sector lending.
The spread of banking had a dual effect. On one hand, it
provided a safe haven for savings and reduced the power of
moneylenders. But, on the other hand, directed credit had little
impact on growth and was a poor substitute for the physical
inputs that were needed for growth (Binswanger & Khandekar,
1995). Even programs like the Integrated Rural Development
Program were plagued by arrears and seemed to have only
limited impact on the borrowers (World Bank, 1988). The government’s treatment of banks’ funds as a substitute for public
spending along with their civil service attitude affected the
incentives to sound lending and weakened banks substantially.
Narsimham Committees I and II engraved the roadmap for
revival and growth of the financial sector, while the Gupta
Committee provided an impetus to rural credit through commercial banks.
Commercial banks have been found to be more suitable for
microfinance because they are regulated and fulfill the conditions of ownership, financial disclosure, and capital adequacy
and they have the necessary physical and financial infrastructure, including a large network of branches, and wellestablished internal control and accounting systems. A review
of the experiences of commercial banks successfully operating
with microfinance showed that Bank Rakhayat Indonesia and
Banco del Desarrallo in Chile, etc., had fully independent
microenterprise retail centers affiliated to the banks that
adopted appropriate lending methodologies. Initial cross subsidization was a normal phenomenon and was evident in banks
like the National Bank for Development Egypt, Centenary
Bank in Uganda, Family Finance Building Society in Kenya,
and some banks in South Africa and Peru. Micro and small
loan interest rates varied between 30% and 60% and were kept
substantially higher for covering the cost of microfinance.
Banks adopted different lending strategies; for example, Banco
Wiese in Peru worked directly through NGOs to disburse
Volume 5 Number 1
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micro loans to groups, while some commercial banks in developing countries began initially with group lending but finally
concentrated on an individual loan methodology. Others like
BancoSol and Scotia Enterprise provided both individual and
group loans. In India, rural branches of commercial banks
undertake both regular banking operations as well microfinance. Regular bank employees who may not necessarily
belong to the area and are also transferable undertake provision of credit to SHGs.
A study of the participation of commercial banks in SHG
financing revealed that they were regularly involved in SHG
financing since 1996–97 up to 2000 and had established 51,619
SHG credit linkages. The State Bank of India (SBI) had the

Table 5. SHG-Bank Linkages of Commercial Banks in
India
Percentage
of population
Average
Average
below poverty SHG
loan by a
loan per
States
line
linkages SHG (Rs) household (Rs)
Himachal
Pradesh
Rajasthan
Jammu &
Kashmir
Sikkim
Manipur
Gujarat
Maharashtra
Goa
Andhra
Pradesh
Kerela
Tamil Nadu
Bihar

7.63
15.28

257
656

27,393
43,704

1,369
2,185

3.48
36.55
28.54
14.07
25.02
4.40

50
01
05
1,824
3,611
19

9,000
10,000
40,000
14,035
21,080
48,947

450
500
2,000
701
1,054
2,447

15.77
12.72
21.12
42.60

24,451
2,682
8,659
420

25,521
22,200
30,964
3,859

1,276
1,110
1,548
193

Data cummulative as of 2000
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maximum coverage, followed by Andhra Bank and the State
Bank of Hyderabad. Besides these banks, the Canara Bank,
Bank of Baroda, Indian Bank, Indian Overseas Bank, and the
Syndicate Bank also had significant credit links. Among the
private sector banks, Vysya Bank had the maximum credit
linkages; however the overall involvement of private sector
banks in the SHG-bank linkage program was marginal.
The commercial banks were predominant, with the highest
credit links in 12 states of India. Out of these, nine states had
lower poverty ratios than the national average. States like
Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Maharashtra had the maximum credit linkages, while in Goa, Sikkim, and Manipur,
where the SHG linkage program was relatively weak, commercial banks were found to be the sole financers.
The average loan per SHG (as well as for the household)
varied across different states. Average loan size was lowest in
Bihar, where 42% of the population lived in abject poverty. In
Jammu and Kashmir, Sikkim, and Gujarat average loan size
was lower than Rs 1000, while in Goa and Maharashtra it was
relatively higher at Rs. 2447 and Rs. 2185 respectively. Under
the program the loan amount is determined on the basis of savings. SHGs with higher magnitude of poverty have lower
propensity to save and hence the loans imparted to the SHGs
were also smaller. The small size of loans in states with higher
incidence of poverty indicates an inverse relationship between
poverty and loan size.
Regional Rural Banks: The regional rural banks 2 (RRBs)
were established in 1975 to support the rural lending operations of commercial banks. In their quest to increase their outreach through subsidized lending the RRBs were bestowed
with the title of “White Elephants” because of their severe nonperforming assets and viability problem. To date a number of
committees have been appointed (Agricultural Credit Review
Committee 1989, M. Narsimham 1991, Bhandari Committee
1994) to suggest ways and means to make these banks economically viable. Based on the recommendations of the Narsimham
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and Bhandari Committees, RRBs were provided greater autonomy for expansion and diversification of loan portfolio by
allowing nontarget and nonpriority sector lending, rural housing sector finance, widening of avenues of profitable investment, reallocation of loss making branches, and opening
extension counters and deregulation of interest rates. The
RRBs were also supported with a fresh infusion of capital from
NABARD and RBI. As a result, RRBs gradually started showing signs of improvement in their performance. The creditable
turnaround was possible due to a series of measures including
increased employee participation, systematic customer contact,
and the introduction of new products suited to the rural markets, like Farmers Credit Card and occupational loans.
The RRBs also responded well to NABARD’s initiative for
extending their outreach to SHGs. Forty one percent of the
SHG linkages were established through the participation of
84% of the RRBs. As one-third of the RRBs were operating in
southern India, the RRBs had maximum linkages here. Manjira

Table 6. SHG-Bank Linkages of Regional Rural Banks in
India
Percentage
of population
Average
Average
below poverty SHG
loan by a
loan per
States
line
linkages SHG (Rs) household (Rs)
Haryana
Assam
Meghalaya
Tripura
Orissa
Madhya
Pradesh
Uttar
Pradesh
Karnataka

8.74
36.09
33.87
34.44
37.15

99
46
117
3
2,405

48,182
11,521
22,991
26,667
9,650

2,409
516
1,149
2,333
482

37.43

1,417

13,529

676

31.15
20.00

8,755
4,120

5,875
24,277

293
1,213

Data cummulative as of 2000.
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Grameen Bank in Andhra Pradesh had maximum linkages with
2713 SHGs, followed by Pandyan Grameen Bank (2177) in
Tamil Nadu and North Malabar Grameen Bank in Kerala
(1266).
The RRBs were predominant in eight states of India. Out
of 38998 SHGs that were credit linked, almost half were in
Karnataka and Uttar Pradesh. In Uttar Pradesh most SHGs
were credit linked through the Kanpur Regional Rural Bank
while in Karnataka, the Cauvery Gramin Bank was predominant. Unlike in the case of commercial banks, the poverty
ratio was higher in the majority of the states where RRBs were
the major financers. The average loan per household was highest (Rs 2409) in Haryana and lowest (Rs 293) in Uttar Pradesh,
signifying that the poorest of the poor were imparted credit.
The average loan amount per household was below Rs. 1000 in
Orissa, Assam, and Madhya Pradesh, where poverty ratios
were relatively higher. In Orissa, the Kalahandi Anchalik
Gramin Bank had maximum linkages.
Regional rural banks acting as SHPIs were more successful
in expanding their outreach. As a part of an ongoing search for
sustainable institutional mechanism for widening the outreach
of financial services to the poor, an experiment was launched
in 1994 to test the feasibility of RRBs working as SHPI. After
an initial experiment with Cauvery Grameena Bank, 10 more
RRBs were encouraged to operate as SHPIs under the guidance
and monitoring of its sponsor bank, participating bank, and
the NABARD.
Cooperative Banks: The cooperative credit system 3 is an
umbrella network consisting of state cooperative banks (SCBs)
at the apex level, district central cooperative banks (DCCBs) at
the intermediate level, and primary agricultural societies
(PACS) at the grassroot level. Every fourth cooperative in
India is a primary credit society. PACS are grassroot level organizations that raise capital, collect deposits, grant loans, and
encourage various income augmenting activities such as horticulture, animal husbandry, bee keeping, and cottage industry.
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DCCBs, on the other hand, organize credit to PACS, carry out
banking business, and sanction, monitor, and control the
implementation of policies.
Cooperative banks have long grappled with operational
problems, as they are both state sponsored and patronized,
which negates democratic management. The basic principle of
cooperative banking, namely, reliance on resources mobilized
locally and lesser dependence on higher credit institutions, has
historically been absent from the Indian system (Kamarker,
1999). High arrears, interest rate ceilings, high priority sector
lending targets, and duality of control between the state governments on one hand and the Reserve Bank/NABARD on the
other have adversely affected the working of cooperative banks
and added to their dubious state.
In view of this, the central government constituted a special task force in April 1999 to study the functioning of rural
cooperative credit institutions. The task force made suggestions for: strengthening the resource base of cooperative banks;
reducing government control and making them member
driven; bringing bank related functions exclusively under
the purview of Banking Regulation Act of 1949; evolving
strong managerial and personnel systems; diversifying their
business products to consumer loans, consortium financing,

Table 7. SHG-Bank Linkages of Cooperative Banks in
India
Percentage
of population
Average
Average
below poverty SHG
loan by a
loan per
States
line
linkages SHG (Rs) household (Rs)
Punjab
West Bengal
Andaman &
Nicobar
Islands

6.16
27.02

20
1,761

52,500
7,938

2,625
396

20.99

23

28,696

1,434

Data cummulative as of 2000.
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and financing of the service sector; distributing insurance products; revising interest rates on loans; and setting up a cooperative rehabilitation and development fund at NABARD at the
national level and a mutual assistance fund at the state level.
The committee also emphasized the imposition of prudential
requirements and a regularized audit of cooperative institutions.
The coverage of cooperative banks in the SHG-bank linkage program was minimal. Only 26 PACS had joined the
program; the Hoogly DCCB in West Bengal had maximum
linkages (1,311), followed by Bidar in Karnataka (827) and
Krishna in Andhra Pradesh (827). Some of the reasons identified for the lower participation of cooperatives were slow
reforms, a lack of proper infrastructure, especially training
centers, and a lack of specialized staff to pursue microfinance.
Furthermore, laws in some states do not allow cooperatives to
lend to SHGs. A state-by-state analysis revealed that a majority
of the SHGs financed by the cooperatives were concentrated in
Punjab, West Bengal, and Andaman and Nicobar Islands
In West Bengal the average loan size was minimal (Rs. 396
per household/member), while in Punjab it was Rs. 2625.
Punjab is a relatively prosperous state with a lower incidence
of poverty. The credit linkages established by DCCBs were
more than those by PACS, since PACS by constitution so far
have not been allowed to lend to SHGs. The process of amendments to allow PACS to lend to SHGs has already begun the
pace of reforms, and together with other legal amendments
will have a substantial bearing on the participation of PACS in
the bank linkage program.

NGOs and SHG Credit Linkages: State-by-State
Non-governmental organizations were pioneer innovators of
the microfinance approach. With the inception of Grameen
Bank in Bangladesh, the notion that a real difference could be
made for the poor through microcredit and that the money
could be paid back as well gained wider acceptability among
the NGO community. Subtly, involuntarily, a shift began to
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occur and credit started to become something to be offered to
people rather than to enterprises. Emphasis on business enterprises began to slip as less and less sophisticated entities became
substitutes for viable enterprises. NGOs began lending for consumption purposes and, as further evidence gathered suggesting poor women’s creditworthiness in terms of their better
repayment capacities, NGOs also started lending to these
women. With time they underwent transformation and a variant typology of institutions emerged.
Tom Ditchler (1999) has classified these NGOs into five
categories: (1) single method replication networks, i.e., NGOs
which are linked to an international NGO family or international network that focuses on microfinance using particular
methodology (ACCION, Family of Grameen Replicates); (2)
multipurpose international NGOs which also have microfinance (CARE, Save the Children); (3) multipurpose national
NGOs which also have microfinance components but are not
part of any formal “family,” though they may have informal
linkages (CARD in Philippines, MYRADA and SEWA in
India); (4) microfinance dedicated national NGOs which came
into being solely as microfinance organizations, were spun off
from international NGOs, or were helped to become significant through international donor support (PRADAN in India,
K-REP in Kenya); (5) national, localized, and sometimes community-based (membership) NGOs, generally very small with
few if any linkages to other organizations—there are tens of
thousands of these registered and their number is growing.
Based on the success of new MFIs, India has ventured into
official collaboration between NGOs, financial institutions,
and the government of India. Collaboration between these
organizations has been an outcome of greater emphases on a
community approach to development through participatory
method. Moreover, the need to be cost effective and sustainable while reaching the poorest was also an important factor in
the collaboration of formal structures and NGOs.

40

Volume 5 Number 1

SHG-Bank Linkage Program in India

Ved Arya (1999) has outlined various forms of relationships between the NGOs and the government, namely,
schematic, dyadic, catalytic/confrontational, and institutional.
In a schematic relationship, the NGO and the government
assume the role of a benefactor and beneficiary; here the
NGOs are merely treated as little more than subcontractors.
Dyadic relations develop in order to execute a mutually agreed
project; here the NGO is in a relatively prominent position;
the government strikes a relationship with a single NGO
because of confidence in its capability. Catalytic roles and relationships exist where the government and NGOs work with
each other to enhance the benefits to the third stakeholder the
disadvantaged community; this relationship is open ended and
can witness certain flip-flop behavior. Institutional relationships are attempted where a program adopts a radically different approach, such as those emphasizing process rather than
targets; the SHG-bank linkage program falls into this category.
The present section makes an attempt to review the credit
linkages established by NGOs with banks for March
1999–2000. As against 550 NGOs during 1998–99, 718 NGOs
were involved in the SHG-bank linkage program in the year
1999–2000. The number of NGOs participating in the program
had increased by 30 percent over the previous year. The majority of the NGO linkages were concentrated in South India, and
the NGOs were mainly functioning as facilitators or as financial intermediaries. Table 8 presents information about NGOs
with major SHG credit links in Indian states.
The Women’s Voluntary Organization in Manipur, the
National Union of Cooperatives in India in Sikkim and in
Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and Boso Reach Out in
Meghalaya emerged as leading NGOs, with more than 80% of
the SHG credit links. Chinmaya Tapovan Trust, Professional
Assistance for Development Action (PRADAN), ACILNavasarjan Rural Development Foundation (ANARDE),
Maharashtra Arthik Vikas Mahamandal (MAVIM), District
Rural Development Agencies (DRDA), and District Women
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Table 8. NGOs with Maximum SHG Credit Links by
States
Name of
Percentage of
State
SHPI/NGO
SHG coverage
Haryana
Rajasthan
Assam
Manipur
Meghalaya
Sikkim
Bihar
Orissa
West Bengal
Andaman &
Nicobar Islands
Madhya Pradesh
Uttar Pradesh
Gujarat
Goa
Maharashtra
Andhra Pradesh
Karnataka
Kerala
Tamil Nadu

Chinmaya
Topovan Trust
DWDA
Deshbandhu Club
Women’s Voluntary
Organization
Bosco Reach Out
NUCI
PRADAN
PREM
SHIS

73.5

95.5
100
56.7
17.4
30

NUCI
Devas Dhar Jambua
Sarvodaya Ashram
ANARDE
NCUI
MAVIM
DRDAs
SKDRDP
CDS
LEAD

84.4
47.5
41
70.6
94.7
66
67
41.1
21.3
9.4

11.4
42.8
100

Development Agency (DWDA) predominated in Haryana,
Bihar, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, and Rajasthan
respectively, with more than 50% of credit linkages. The
League for Education and Development (LEAD) in Tamil
Nadu, the Community Development Society (CDS) in Kerala,
Sarvodaya Ashram in Uttar Pradesh, Dewas Dhar Jambhua in
Madhya Pradesh, the People’s Rural Education Movement
(PREM) in Orissa, and Deshbandhu and Southern Health
Improvement Samiti/Kashinagar Vivekanand Kendra (SHIS) in
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West Bengal were the other NGOs with maximum SHG credit
linkages.
The state government functionaries operating as SHPIs
were predominant in Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan. The
Swarnajayanti Grameen Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY) program
launched by the government of India has been routing credit to
SHGs through the DRDA/DWDAs with the active involvement of banks and NGOs. The scheme provides capital as
well as interest subsidies to the SHGs. Bosco Reach Out works
with the government for implementation of the SGRY in
Meghalaya and also imparts training for management and organization of SHGs in Meghalaya.
The NUCI was the main facilitator in Sikkim and
Andaman and Nicobar Islands while Peoples Rural Education
Movement (PREM) promoted, facilitated, and provided sustainable livelihood to the tribal population in Orissa. Another
NGO, ANARDE Foundation, started its activities in Gujarat
in 1979 with the adoption of five villages. Today it covers
8,675 villages and renders over US$ 110 million assistance.
LEAD, in Tamil Nadu, was formed in 1987 with the aim of
organizing women around issues of alcoholism, bonded labor,
and destitution. It gradually moved on to microfinance, and
today LEAD’s microfinance program has gained predominance
over its development programs. MAVIM in Maharashtra has
played a major role in promoting SHGs under the Maharashtra
Rural Credit Project of IFAD. By the end of March 2,000, the
project had promoted around 5,000 SHGs, reaching approximately 80,000 rural women (MRCP, India).
Sri Kshetra Dharmasthala Rural Development Project
(SKDRDP) in Karnataka was initiated to rejuvenate villages
and restore village life by strengthening its natural, social, and
economic roots. The NGO adopted a “Pragati Bandhu” concept which not only focused on SHGs but also on sharing
labor for developing the area through community work.
Southern Health Improvement Samiti (SHIS) in West Bengal
began working with health but later on diversified its activities
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to support the Women’s Empowerment Program. Under the
program women were organized into SHGs to increase their
credit accessibility and improve health. Community
Development Society (CDS, Allepy) in Kerala is a successful
model of women in development and has been replicated in 57
towns and one entire district in Kerala State. In 1993, 10,304
women from poor families with the support of UNICEF, the
federal government, and the state government had organized
themselves into a community development society. The NGO
supported a wide range of activities from income-generating
schemes for women, thrift, and shelter upgrading to housing,
childcare, and sanitation programs. CDS has gained recognition and legitimization from the government through official
approval of CDS bylaws.
With a view to facilitate entry of new NGO partners,
NABARD has developed the concept of “Resource NGOs.”
NGOs with long standing experience and adequate skill and
capacity in microfinance act as resource centers to provide
training and guidance to other NGOs to enable them to take
up SHG promotion; Chinmaya Tapovan Trust in Haryana is
one such NGO. PRADAN, established in 1983, is India’s leading NGO in microfinance: it works in Bihar, Karnataka,
Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar
Pradesh, and West Bengal. The NGO supports agricultural
activities like wasteland development, and improved upland
cultivation, and it also supports women’s groups for savings,
credit, and income generation.
The level of participation of the majority of NGOs in the
SHG-bank linkage program was limited. A large majority of
the NGOs participating in the program had less than 100
SHGs credit linked, while only a few had 250 SHGs.

Conclusions and Observations
Microfinance has emerged as a vital approach to meet the heterogeneous needs of the poor. In India, microfinance in the
formal sector has assumed the form of SHG-bank linkage
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program. Through this program, the Reserve Bank of India
and NABARD have tried to promote relationship banking,
i.e., “Improving the existing relationship between the poor and
the bankers with the social intermediation of the NGOs.” The
SHG-bank linkage program in India is rapidly expanding its
outreach under the pioneering initiative of NABARD, the
monitoring and supervision of RBI, and the promotional policies of the government of India. At the grassroot level the program is being implemented by the commercial banks,
cooperatives, and regional rural banks, with government agencies like DRDA/DWDA acting as facilitators. As of March
2000, 114,775 SHGs were credit linked, with the majority of
them being fostered in the years since the Global Micro Credit
Summit in Washington. With an average membership of
twenty members per SHG, the program has catered to 2.295
million poor households.
With coverage of two-thirds of SHG credit linkages, the
linkage program was predominant in the Andhra Pradesh,
Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and Uttar Pradesh states of India.
Further, among these four states the program was heavily concentrated in Andhra Pradesh, where 40% of credit linkages
were established. The acceptability of the program was relatively higher in southern India, because the savings and the
credit movement was launched here. Some of the other contributory factors were large coverage of DWACRA groups and
the operation of Swarna Jayanti Swarojgar Yojna Program and
the presence of leading MFIs. Kerala, Maharashtra, Orissa,
West Bengal, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Bihar
together had 23.6% SHG linkages, while the remaining states
and union territories had only 1.47% SHG credit linkages.
Northeastern India and Jammu and Kashmir need special attention and action plans because of the complexities prevalent in
the regional, political, economical, and human conditions. In
Haryana and Punjab the pro poor program had few takers. The
major reasons identified for the spatial coverage of the program in some states were a lack of concentrated efforts by
bankers; the absence of large sized NGOs operating as MFIs;
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few international development projects with focus on income
generation; and a lack of initiatives to dovetail existing
government programs with the bank linkage program.
Out of the three major lending rural institutions involved
in retailing, the commercial banks and RRBs were more forthcoming in lending to SHGs. Commercial banks were predominant in relatively better off states, where poverty incidences
were lower, while RRBs were more dominant in poorer states
and were more successful while acting as SHPIs. The global
experiences of commercial banks dealing with microfinance
suggest the need for the restructuring of branches, environment, attitudes, and their regulatory norms. The cooperatives
in India have yet not ventured into SHG financing in a fullfledged manner. Despite the large presence of PACS, the
majority of the linkages were forged by the DCCBs. Laws in
some states in India still do not allow PACS to lend to SHGs.
With legal reforms on the way, the cooperatives are expected
expand their outreach to SHGs. However, the pace of reforms
will have a substantial bearing on the involvement of cooperatives. The loan amount deployed to the SHG is dependent on
the savings mobilized by the groups. In states with a high incidence of poverty, the average loan amount was smaller, while
it was relatively higher in better off states. Initial loans to the
poor can merely act as a catalyst to instigate a process, but to
make a significant change, the MFIs would need to impart
repeat loans.
During the year 1999–2000, 718 NGOs participated in the
SHG-bank linkage program; the number of NGOs increased
by 30% over the previous year. Out of the NGOs and SHPIs
predominating in different states of India, the majority were
DRDAs/DWDAs acting as government agencies or SHGs supported by international organizations. NGOs with the back-up
support of external agencies were relatively more successful in
establishing credit linkages. In brief the SHG-bank linkage program has succeeded in reaching around 2.2 million poor households with major coverage of women. This has been an
outstanding achievement, albeit one with severe spatial imbalance.
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Notes
The exchange rate of rupees into dollar for the year 1997–98 was Rs. 37.165,
in year 1998–99 it was Rs. 42.333, and in 1999–2000 it was Rs. 43.333.
1. In September 2000, the number of commercial banks was 297, of which
196 were RRBs. The commercial banks had 32632 rural, 14431 semiurban, 10244
urban, and 8428 metropolitan offices. The per office population was 15000.
Commercial banks are governed by the Banking Regulation Act of 1949 and
interest rates up to Rs. 0.2 million were regulated by RBI.
2. As of March 2000 almost 54% of the advances were provided to the nonagricultural sector while agricultural advances constituted 46.3%. Out of 193
RRBs, 160 were recorded as profit making. The operating profits to total assets
had increased because of increase in interest income and the decline in the intermediation ratio. The share of NPAs had also declined to 27.9% from 32.8% at
the end of 1999.
3. At the end of March 2000, almost every village in India had a PACS. The
total number of PACS operating were 91,110 with an average membership of 995
and an average deposit of Rs 325007. The share of deposits to advances of PACS
was 26.9%. There were 361 DCCBs operating with a membership of Rs 1570 million with deposit to advances ratio of 62.2%.
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Acronyms
ANARDE
BASIX
CARD
CASPOR Ltd
CDS
DCCBs
DRDA
DWDA
DWCRA
HDI
IFAD
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ACIL-Navasarjan Rural Development Foundation
Bharatiya Samruddhi Investments Consulting Services Ltd.
Centre for Agriculture and Rural Development
CASHPOR Financial and Technical Services Pvt. Ltd
Community Development Society
District Central Cooperative Banks
District Rural Development Agency
District Women Development Agency
Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas
Human Development Index
International Fund for Agriculture Development

Volume 5 Number 1

SHG-Bank Linkage Program in India
K-REP
LEAD
MAVIM
MFIs
MYRADA
NABARD
NGO
NUCI
PACS
PRADAN
PREM
RBI
RRBs
SHPI
SHARE
SHGs
SCBs
SHIS
SEWA
SHARE
SKDRDP
SGSY

Kenya Republic and Rural Enterprise Program
League for Education and Development
Maharashtra Arthik Vikas Mahamandal
Microfinance institutions
Mysore Resettlement and Development Agency
National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development
Non Governmental Organizations
National Union of Cooperatives in India
Primary Agricultural Credit Societies
Professional Assistance For Development Action
Peoples Rural Education Movement
Reserve Bank of India
Regional Rural Banks
Self Help Group Promoting Institution
Society for Helping Awaking Rural Poor through Education
Self Help Groups
State Cooperative Banks
Southern Health Improvement Samiti
Self-Employed Women’s Association
Society for Helping Awakening Rural Poor through Education
Sri Kshetra Dharmasthala Rural Development Project
Swarnajayanti Grameen Swarozgar Yojana
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